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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Robert Scott Lippert appeals from the Order Vacating and Reentering 
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand to Determine Motion for Substitute 
Counsel. Mr. Lippert asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it denied 
him substitute counsel because he demonstrated that a complete, irrevocable 
breakdown in communication existed and, therefore, the district court deprived him of 
conflict free counsel. Therefore, he contends that this Court should reverse the district 
court's order denying him a substitute counsel, and remand the matter for a new trial. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Lippert with sexual abuse of a child under 
the age of sixteen years. State v. Lippert, 145 Idaho 586, _, 181 P.3d 512, 515 (Ct. 
App. 2007) (hereinafter Lippert I). Mr. Lippert requested an attorney and the district 
court appointed him a public defender. Id. During pretrial proceedings, Mr. Lippert 
asked the court to replace his trial attorney with a different public defender. Id. On the 
morning of trial, Mr. Lippert refused to leave riis jail cell to attend the trial. Id. at_, 181 
P.3d at 592. Eventually, jail staff brought Mr. Lippert to court. Id. Upon being 
presented to the district court, Mr. Lippert complained about his attorney, however, the 
district court failed to conduct an adequate inquiry into the alleged conflict and into 
Mr. Lippert's requests for appointment of substitute counsel. Id. at_, 181 P.3d at 520. 
A jury convicted Mr. Lippert and he appealed the Judgment of Conviction. Id. at , 181 
P.3d at 512, 514. 
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Among other things in Lippert I, Mr. Lippert challenged the district court's 
inadequate inquiry into his complaints about his court-appointed counsel. Id. at_, 181 
P.3d at 515. The Idaho Court of Appeals remanded the matter to the district court for 
further proceedings "to give Lippert a full and fair opportunity to present facts and 
reasons in support of his motion for substitute counsel." Id. at_, 181 P.3d at 523. 
The Court of Appeals stated, "If Lippert's complaints about his appointed counsel 
amounted to good cause justifying the appointment of substitute counsel, the district 
court must also grant Lippert a new trial. However, if the court determines Lippert's 
request for substitution of counsel was unfounded, the judgment of conviction will be 
affirmed." Id. 
On remand, Mr. Lippert hired an attorney to represent him to assist at the hearing 
to explain why he should have received substitute counsel. (R., p.53.) The district court 
conducted a hearing on September 15, 2008. (R., p.53.) Mr. Lippert testified that he 
had an actual conflict of interest with his trial attorney because of counsel's past 
representation of a family member and of a business partner. (Tr., p.10, Ls.2-6.) 
Additionally, Mr. Lippert explained that a breakdown of communication necessitated 
substituting counsel. (Tr., p.13, L.6 - p.50, L.4.) 
The district court determined that Mr. Lippert did not have good cause for his 
request for substitute counsel on the morning of the first day of trial. (R., p.56.) The 
court determined there was no actual conflict of interest due to counsel's past 
representation of either Mr. Lippert's family member or his business partner. (R., pp.56-
57.) Thereafter, the district court evaluated whether a complete, irrevocable breakdown 
of communication between Mr. Lippert and his appointed counsel existed. (R., p.57.) 
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Utilizing a standard mentioned in Lippert I, the district court concluded that it must 
consider the following factors: 
1) whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 2) whether 
the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the 
motion; 3) whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led 
to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense; and 4) 
whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the 
communication breakdown. 
(R., pp.57-58.) Upon considering the above factors, the district court concluded that it 
was not convinced that a total breakdown of communication occurred. (R., pp.57-62.) 
Moreover, it concluded that Mr. Lippert contributed to the communication breakdown. 
(R., pp.63-65.) Although not argued by Mr. Lippert's attorney, the district court also 
evaluated whether substitution of counsel should have been granted due to an unjust 
verdict, and concluded that good cause did not exists under that theory. (R., pp.66-67.) 
Mr. Lippert's attorney failed to timely appeal the district court's decision. (R., 
p.53.) However, Mr. Lippert timely filed a petition for post-conviction relief to reacquire 
his appellate rights. (R., p.53.) Pursuant to a post-conviction order, the district court 
filed an Order Vacating and Reentering Memorandum Opinion and Order on Remand to 
Determine Motion for Substitute Counsel. (R., pp.53-69.) 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it failed to appoint substitute counsel to 
represent Mr. Lippert because a complete, irrevocable breakdown of communication 
between Mr. Lippert and his counsel existed? 
4 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Appoint Substitute Counsel 
To Represent Mr. Lippert Because A Complete, Irrevocable Breakdown Of 
Communication Between Mr. Lippert And His Counsel Existed 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Lippert contends the district court erred when it failed to appoint him 
substitute counsel. Therefore, the order denying substitute counsel should be reversed 
and the matter remanded for a new trial. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The district court's decision to overrule a defendant's objection to conflicted 
counsel should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Morgan v. Commissioner of 
Correction, 866 A.2d 649, 655 (Conn. App. 2005). When reviewing an order for an 
abuse of discretion, the appellate courts engage in a multi-tiered inquiry. State v. 
Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). This Court must determine: 
(1) whether the district court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) 
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently 
with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the 
lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Failed To Appoint Substitute 
Counsel 
"Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by 
counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he 
may have." United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984). The Sixth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution provides that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
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accused shall enjoy the right ... to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 
U.S. Const. amend. VI. This constitutional protection encompasses a right to be 
represented by conflict free counsel. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981 ); 
Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69-70 (1942). Moreover, this protection has long 
since been held to apply to state court criminal proceedings through the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Powel! v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932); 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 60, 90 P.3d 278, 285 (2003). Due to the pervasive 
nature of this right, the district court must proactively protect the accused's Sixth 
Amendment rights in order to secure a just and fair trial. United States v. Massino, 303 
F.Supp.2d 258, 263 (2003). 
Not only does a defendant have a federal constitutional right to the assistance of 
conflict-free counsel, Idaho adopted a similar provision in its Constitution. See State v. 
Guzman, 126 Idaho 368, 371, 883 P.2d 726, 729 (Ct. App. 1994) (recognizing the 
United States and Idaho State constitutional right to be represented by conflict-free 
counsel). Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution guarantees the right to counsel. 
Pharris v. State, 91 Idaho 456, 424 P.2d 390 (1967). Our state's appellate cases have 
held that a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to assistance of counsel at all 
critical stages of the criminal process. State v. King, 131 Idaho 374, 376, 957 P.2d 352, 
354 (Ct. App. 1998); see also State v. Ruth, 102 Idaho 638, 637 P .2d 415 (1981 ); 
State v. Lindsay, 124 Idaho 825, 864 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. 1993). In addition, Idaho law 
confers a statutory right to counsel in state criminal proceedings. See I.C. § 19-852. 
Idaho Code § 19-852 provides that a needy person is entitled to be represented by 
court-appointed counsel to the same extent as a person that has a retained attorney. 
Id. 
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The Lippert I Court acknowledged, "[g]ood cause [for substitution of counsel] 
includes an actual conflict of interest; a complete, irrevocable breakdown of 
communication; or an irreconcilable conflict which leads to an apparently unjust verdict." 
Lippert I, 145 Idaho at_, 181 P.3d at 522 (citations omitted). Although Lippert I did not 
adopt the four-part test identified in United States v. Lott, 310 F.3d 1231, 1250 (10th Cir. 
1981) for determining whether a breakdown in communication existed, it noted the 10th 
Circuit's factors in a parenthetical. Id. at_, 191 P .3d at 523. The following factors: 
1) whether the defendant's motion for new counsel was timely; 2) whether 
the trial court adequately inquired into defendant's reasons for making the 
motion; 3) whether the defendant-attorney conflict was so great that it led 
to a total lack of communication precluding an adequate defense; and 4) 
whether the defendant substantially and unreasonably contributed to the 
communication breakdown. 
See id., were considered by the district court on remand. (R., pp.40-41.) 
The district court concluded that Mr. Lippert's motion was timely. (R., p.58 n.4.) 
Additionally, the district court conducted an inquiry on September 8, 2008, to 
accomplish the second factor - the adequate inquiry. (R., p.58 n.5.) The district court 
concluded that Mr. Lippert failed to present sufficient facts to demonstrate a total lack of 
communication precluding an adequate defense and that he did not contribute to the 
breakdown. (R., pp.58-65.) Mr. Lippert asserts that the district court erred in applying 
the facts to the law and, therefore, its conclusion is incorrect. 
Mr. Lippert expressed misgivings about his attorney's trial preparation. (Tr., p.14, 
L.25 - p.15, L.4.) He claimed that his attorney failed to discuss whether he should 
testify at trial and failed to prepare him for testifying. (Tr., p.27, Ls.2-23.) Additionally, 
he claimed that he informed his attorney about witnesses that he believed would be 
instrumental in his defense and believed counsel failed to contact those individuals or 
complete a full investigation before the scheduled trial. (Tr., p.29, L.6 - p.30, L.19.) 
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Specifically, Mr. Lippert demanded that his ex-wife be contacted and subpoenaed for 
trial. (Tr., p.30, Ls.9-19.) Furthermore, Mr. Lippert explained he sought clarification on 
certain pretrial issues and reduced those concerns to writing; however, his trial attorney 
failed to respond. (Tr., p.13, Ls.17-24; p.29, Ls.14-18; p.30, Ls.23-25.) Mr. Lippert 
complained that his attorney failed to prepare him for scheduled hearings or inform him 
about the hearing ahead of time. (Tr., p.21, Ls.2-1 0; p.22, Ls.5-10.) Mr. Lippert 
complained that he believed his attorney had alcohol on his breath and that he could not 
track in court. (Tr., p.19, Ls.21-25). 
Mr. Lippert admitted that he testified at trial and that his attorney asked him 
questions and he answered the inquiry. (Tr., p.24, Ls.11-23.) He admitted that after 
discharging his attorney at the sentencing hearing, he did pose questions to the 
removed attorney, as the court refused to appoint substitute counsel and left the 
removed attorney available as standby counsel. (Tr., p.23, L.1 - p.24, L.10.) 
Although counsel disagreed with most of Mr. Lippert's accusations, he did 
acknowledge that communication after the 404(b) hearing became extremely difficult. 
(See generally Tr., p.50, L.17 - p.76, L.3; Tr., p.62, Ls.10-13.) He explained that after 
that hearing, Mr. Lippert could only express his dissatisfaction with the witnesses' 
testimony, claiming that they were lying. (Tr., p.62, Ls.14-16.) Trial counsel believed 
that Mr. Lippert was still able to assist with the defense during the trial. (Tr., p.76, Ls.2-
3.) Mr. Lippert disagreed because he believed most of the communication throughout 
the entire representation was a one-way effort by him. (Tr., p.13, Ls.17-24; p.29, Ls.14-
18; p.30, Ls.23-25.) 
In summary, Mr. Lippert contends that an irreconcilable breakdown of 
communication occurred which did affect his defense. Moreover, he contends he did 
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not cause the breakdown. Mr. Lippert contends that the facts presented to the district 
court demonstrated that he should have been provided substitute counsel. Therefore, 
the district court abused its discretion denying his requests. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Lippert respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court order 
denying him substitute counsel and remand the matter for a new trial. 
DATED this 4th day of October, 2011. 
EM. WALK R 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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